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THE CHANGING ROLE OF PRIVATE LAND
RESTRICTIONS: REFORMING SERVITUDE LAW
Michael J.D. Sweeney*
INTRODUCTION
In 1938, Ms. Holland purchased an estate, Blackacre, in Sullivan
County, New York. The Electric Company owned an adjacent estate,
Whiteacre. When Mr. McGregor, the original owner of both White-
acre and Blackacre, sold Whiteacre, he did so subject to a restriction
that Whiteacre would be used only as a hydroelectric generating plant.
McGregor recited the restriction in the recorded Whiteacre deed.
Neither Holland nor the Electric Company were parties to the origi-
nal covenant restricting the use of Whiteacre, but both parties
purchased their estates with knowledge that the restriction existed.
In 1940, condemnation of the riparian rights of both estates by the
City of New York made use of Whiteacre as a hydroelectric plant im-
possible. The Electric Company sued for declaratory relief, to have
the restriction removed because it could not use the land as a hydroe-
lectric plant nor could it use the land for anything else because of the
restriction in the deed. The Electric Company claimed the restriction
had become unreasonable in light of recent developments because it
rendered the company's property worthless. Holland claimed that the
land she owned, Blackacre, benefited from the restriction. She
purchased Blackacre in large part because the restriction was in place
and would prevent development of the land adjacent to hers, thus
maintaining a rural environment. Holland felt that removing the re-
striction would devalue her land and violate an agreement concerning
the properties she and the Electric Company purchased.
Under these circumstances a court could decide that the conditions
surrounding the servitude had changed substantially since its creation
and the changes justified its removal. A court could deny any dam-
ages to Holland and allow the Electric Company to retain title to the
land free of the restriction.'
What happens to Holland's right to enjoy her land in a rural set-
ting? Why would the solution be all or nothing? Such Solomonic res-
olutions are the norm in the realm of servitude law. Servitudes are
* I would like to thank Professor Michael Madison and Neil Saffer for their
insightful comments, and my family and Sallie Sills for their patience and support.
1. An estate restricted from certain land uses by a servitude may sue in equity for
relief from the servitude or a declaration as to the enforceability of the servitude if the
servitude is of no actual and substantial benefit to the parties involved. See Orange &
Rockland Utils. v. Philwold Estates, 418 N.E2d 1310, 1315 (N.Y. 1981); Restatement
of Property § 564 (1944) [hereinafter Restatement].
2. See, e.g., Orange & Rockland Utils., 418 N.E.2d at 1310 (finding, under similar
circumstances, that the servitude was obsolete and therefore should not be enforced).
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private restrictions on another's land.3 When conflicting interests de-
velop between successors in interest to servitudes, courts must decide
whose interests will prevail or find an equitable compromise.
This Note traces the history of servitude law, discusses problems
with its current state, and suggests modifications to create a clear, ef-
fective body of law. Part I traces the history of servitudes from their
English origins through present day U.S. servitude law. Part II dis-
cusses problems arising under the current law and its inability to meet
the needs of today's economic and social environment. Part III pro-
poses a combination of reforms to create a unified, clear body of servi-
tude law that addresses the purposes and problems of servitudes in
today's environment. This Note concludes that a unified servitude law
that narrows the role of established doctrines, implements statutory
time limits on servitudes, and expands the remedies available for ter-
mination and modification would provide a clear body of law that suc-
cessfully addresses both public policy and market concerns.
I. HISTORY OF SERVITUDES
Much of servitude law originated in the mid-nineteenth century in
England and the United States as a contract-based means to circum-
vent onerous property-based conveyancing rules.4 Early in the twenti-
eth century, due to a view of servitudes as restraints on alienation,
U.S. courts and the Restatement of the Law of Property opted to de-
fine servitudes in property terms and created a number of doctrines to
limit their use.5 Although the use of servitudes has vastly expanded
and American society now views them as necessary and valuable
tools, modem servitude law still carries many of the vestiges reflecting
distaste for private land restrictions.6 This part discusses the origins of
servitude law, the shift from contract to property principles as the ba-
sis of servitude law, and the current state of servitude law.
3. See Black's Law Dictionary 1370 (6th ed. 1990); James L. Winokur, The Mixed
Blessings of Promissory Servitudes: Toward Optimizing Economic Utility, Individual
Liberty, and Personal Identity, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 1, 9 ("Promissory servitudes are
often described as solutions to conflicts between 'incompatible land uses.' ").
4. See infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
5. See infra part I.B.
6. See infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
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A. Origins of Servitudes
Property law recognizes three types of real servitudes:7 easements,"
restrictive covenants,9 and equitable servitudes."0 Each of these types
of obligations can pass from the owner of an estate 1 to subsequent
purchasers, a concept known as "running with the land."' 2 The first of
these servitudes recognized in common law was the easement, which
traces its origins back to Roman law.13
1. Easements
By the early 1800s, English courts recognized easements as affirma-
tive rights to enter and use the land of another. 4 No general theory
of easements existed, however. 5 Prior to the mid-nineteenth century,
England recognized only affirmative easements 6 and with few excep-
tions did not allow private restrictions on the use of another's land.'7
7. Gregory S. Alexander, Freedom, Coercion, and the Law of Servitudes, 73 Cor-
nell L. Rev. 883, 883 (1988).
8. An easement is a right enforceable against the land of another. Charles M.
Haar & Lance Liebman, Property and Law 912 (2d ed. 1985). It provides one party,
the owner of the easement, with the right to either use the other party's land in a
prescribed manner (an affirmative easement) or to limit the use of that estate (a nega-
tive easement). See Restatement, supra note 1, pt. I introductory note, at 3148-52.
9. A restrictive covenant that runs with the land is an exception to the rule
against assigning choses of action. "Running with the land" is a concept developed in
common law to extend the ability to assign liability of an agreement from an original
party to a subsequent purchaser of the estate. Because the concept is an exception, it
has developed certain highly technical limitations to its use. For example, at common
law, parties to a restrictive covenant must meet horizontal and vertical privity require-
ments and the agreement itself must "touch and concern" the land. See Restatement,
supra note 1, pt. I introductory note, at 3150-61; Orange & Rockland Utils. v.
Philwold Estates, 418 N.E.2d 1310, 1313 (N.Y. 1981).
10. An equitable servitude is a promise concerning the use of land. While equita-
ble servitudes do not meet the strict requirements of restrictive covenants, courts use
their broader discretion in equity to enforce the promise. Haar & Liebman, supra
note 8, at 958; see, e.g., Tulk v. Moxhay, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848) (enforcing a
promise concerning the land even though it was not in the proper form to be a restric-
tive covenant).
11. The term "estate" includes all freehold estates, including fee simples and life
estates. Jon W. Bruce et al., Modern Property Law: Cases and Materials 282-300
(1984). Servitudes act as limitations on this right to possess and enjoy the land.
Black's Law Dictionary 1370 (6th ed. 1990).
12. Charles E. Clark, Real Covenants And Other Interests Which "Run With
Land" 2-3 (2d ed. 1947); see also supra note 9.
13. See Uriel Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. Cal. L
Rev. 1177, 1185 n.36 (1982).
14. Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, Property 790-91 (3d ed. 1993); Winokur,
supra note 3, at 12.
15. Reichman, supra note 13, at 1185.
16. An affirmative easement is the right to use a servient estate in some way that
would otherwise be unlawful. This is distinguished from a negative easement that
prohibits the owner of an estate to use her land in a certain way. Black's Law Diction-
ary 60 (6th ed. 1990).
17. English property law included only four exceptions to the limitation on private
restrictions. The exceptions, called "negative easements," included obstruction of
1995]
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This limitation reflected the two social policy concerns regarding ser-
vitudes that continue to influence current law: notice of restrictions
to subsequent purchasers of land and potential restrictions on
alienability.' 8
In the mid-nineteenth century, lack of notice to purchasers of land
posed a real danger with respect to private restrictions on land use.
England lacked an effective system of recording land titles, 19 and pur-
chasers had limited ways of obtaining notice of land restrictions.20
Purchasers could view the land, at which point affirmative burdens
would tend to be apparent, or they could question the neighbors and
seller. For instance, a prospective buyer of land could detect with rel-
ative ease an affirmative easement for the right of way over the estate
by observing the lay of the land and the activity upon it. By contrast,
most restrictions on the land were not detectable by viewing.21 For
example, a negative easement or restrictive covenant such as a prohi-
bition on certain types of farming would not be detectable by simple
observation. Nonetheless, under the easement theory, a servitude
bound a subsequent purchaser, regardless of notice, once she
purchased the land.22 In an effort to prevent the inequity of binding
people who were unaware of their liability and avoid the litigation
that would inevitably ensue, English courts strictly construed formal
requirements for the running of servitudes of any sort.23 These techni-
cal requirements were discretionary 4 and allowed courts to invalidate
servitudes when they felt a party did not receive fair notice.
light or air, removal of building support, and blockage of an artificial stream. In addi-
tion, some covenants were allowed in leases. Winokur, supra note 3, at 12.
18. See Keppell v. Bailey, 39 Eng. Rep. 1042 (Ch. 1834) (requiring that privity of
estate exist between covenanting parties in order for a servitude to run with the land);
Gerald Korngold, For Unifying Servitudes and Defeasible Fees: Property Law's Func-
tional Equivalents, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 533, 542-43 (1988) (noting that the rationale for
limiting the use of restrictive covenants is protecting alienability of property inter-
ests); Susan F. French, Servitudes Reform and the New Restatement of Property: Crea-
tion Doctrines and Structural Simplification, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 928, 934 n.25 (1988)
(stating that the original function of privity was to give notice to subsequent purchas-
ers of property interests) [hereinafter French, Structural Simplification].
19. Despite earlier efforts, England did not develop an effective public registration
system for interests in land until 1925. Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of
Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1261, 1283 n.114 (1982)
[hereinafter French, Ancient Strands]; see Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, Prop-
erty 962 (1981) [hereinafter Dukeminier and Krier, 1981].
20. See French, Ancient Strands, supra note 19, at 1284.
21. See id. at 1283.
22. Dukeminier & Krier, 1981, supra note 19, at 962.
23. See Keppell v. Bailey, 39 Eng. Rep. 1042, 1049 (Ch. 1834) (requiring a land-
lord-tenant relationship to meet the privity requirement for covenants concerning the
land and expressing disdain for the idea that landowners could burden their land in
any way).
24. See Dukeminier & Krier, 1981, supra note 19, at 964.
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Until the mid-nineteenth century, the United States followed the
English philosophy of strictly limiting private restrictions on land.25
Because the United States had not yet developed a reliable system of
recording deeds, and U.S. servitude law mirrored English law, U.S.
courts had the same concerns and problems as their English
counterparts.
Both English and U.S. law discouraged the use of servitudes, view-
ing them as unreasonable restrictions on the alienability of land 6
Courts and commentators criticized restrictions that ran with the land
as hindering alienability27 because such restrictions could prevent par-
ties from buying or selling land. 8 Purchasers were understandably
wary of potential limitations on the uses of land, particularly when
they had no reliable way of detecting such restrictions. While parties
could remove servitudes,29 the transaction costs"0 to effect removal
often prevented the sale.3 1 In addition, the efficient allocation of land
was an important socioeconomic goal in mid-nineteenth century Eng-
land and the United States. Because notice deficiencies and alienabil-
ity restrictions threatened this goal,32 courts frowned upon private
land restrictions.33
2. Development of Restrictive Covenants and Equitable Servitudes
In the late-nineteenth century, as the industrial revolution displaced
agrarian society, suburban communities began to form on the outside
of large industrial cities and people sought ways to protect the peace-
ful environment surrounding their homes? 4 The rigidity of the ex-
isting land conveyancing rules limited landowners' ability to preserve
25. See, eg., Morse v. Aldrich, 36 Mass. (1 Pick.) 449, 453-54 (1837) (stating the
early-nineteenth-century common law rule that for a covenant to run with the land
the relation of lessor and lessee, or grantor and grantee, must exist between the
parties).
26. See Proprietors of the Church in Brattle Square v. Moses Grant, 69 Mass. (1
Gray) 142, 148 (1855) (stating the legal policy in favor of alienable property which
"aims to secure the free and unembarrassed disposition of real property"); Clark,
supra note 12, at 71-72 (recognizing the Anglo-American legal view which "frown[s]
upon" restraints on alienability).
27. Korngold, supra note 18, at 543.
28. Id. at 543-44.
29. Servitudes can be terminated by merger, when the dominant and servient es-
tate become one, or by release, when the parties to the servitude agree to terminate it.
Richard R. Powell & Patrick J. Rohan, Powell on Real Property 735-36 (abr. ed. 1968)
[hereinafter Powell & Rohan].
30. Transaction costs are the costs of transferring a legal or property right. Richard
A. Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law § 3.1, at 35 (4th ed. 1992).
31. See Clark, supra note 12, at 71-72.
32. Dukeminier & Krier, 1981, supra note 19, at 959-67.
33. Wimokur, supra note 3, at 12-13; see, e.g., Keppell v. Bailey, 39 Eng. Rep. 1042,
1049 (Ch. 1834) (creating strict technical requirements as a method of limiting private
land restrictions from binding subsequent purchasers).
34. Russell R. Reno, The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes In Land: Part 1, 28
Va. L. Rev. 951, 970 (1942).
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the character of their communities. For example, a landowner had no
way to ensure that a new neighbor did not move in and build a factory
next door to her home. English and U.S. courts responded by devel-
oping equitable servitudes and restrictive covenants35 as methods of
private zoning that would permit landowners to restrict the use of land
to favored activities.36
The U.S. judiciary developed restrictive covenants, which are bind-
ing promises concerning the land.37 Courts justified these private re-
strictions by reasoning that the promises were contracts and thus not
subject to the conveyancing restrictions.38 By introducing restrictive
covenants into the realm of contract law, the courts could enforce the
agreements without offending property principles.39
In response to the demand for legal mechanisms to create private
land restrictions, English courts first recognized equitable servitudes
in 1848.40 Equitable servitudes provided for private land restrictions
much like restrictive covenants under U.S. law.41 While English
courts did recognize restrictive covenants, they did not permit the bur-
den on the servient estate to run with the land. Therefore, under the
theory of restrictive covenants, English courts would not enforce a re-
strictive covenant that burdened an estate.42 The courts created equi-
35. Equitable servitudes, covenants running with the land, and restrictive cove-
nants developed in response to old restrictive land conveyancing rules. Lawrence Ber-
ger, A Policy Analysis of Promises Respecting the Use of Land, 55 Minn. L. Rev. 167,
169 (1970) [hereinafter L. Berger].
36. The growth of industrial centers and suburban developments created a de-
mand for a legal machinery that would protect investments in these developments.
Courts allow servitudes to supplement zoning and other governmental regulation.
Reno, supra note 34, at 970; Winokur, supra note 3, at 13-15.
37. See Morse v. Aldrich, 36 Mass. (1 Pick.) 449, 452-53 (1837) (freeing restrictive
covenants from common law rules of land conveyancing because the covenants are
supported by consideration).
38. See id. at 453 (finding that the conveyance principles of common law do not
apply to restrictive covenants running with the land and stating that when a covenant
runs with the land, "he who holds the land, whether by descent ... or by his express
assignment, shall be bound by the covenant").
39. Covenants running with the land are created in contract and create rights in
personam, against contracting parties, rather than the traditional property rights
which are in rem, or against the world. Reno, supra note 34, at 961.
40. Tulk v. Moxhay, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848); see Winokur, supra note 3, at
13.
41. While English courts allowed benefits to run with the land, they would not
allow a burden to run under the theory of restrictive covenants. In some instances
this approach allowed land purchasers with notice of an agreement to avoid their
obligations by using a defense of no formal notice. To avoid this injustice, English
courts created equitable servitudes, a device that enforces, in equity rather than at
law, promises concerning the land made by the owner against anyone who purchased
the land with notice. Reno, supra note 34, at 971.
42. English courts could find that covenants ran with the land when the issue was
a benefit to an estate. English common law, however, would not allow a burden upon
an estate to run with the land except as between landlord and tenant. Walter
Strachan, Covenants Annexed to Rentcharges, 40 Law Q. Rev. 344, 345-47 (1924).
[Vol. 64
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table servitudes in an effort to avoid the inequity of allowing
subsequent purchasers of land to shirk the responsibilities created by
agreements they had freely accepted. This concept allowed English
courts to enforce promises concerning land that did not meet the more
exacting requirements of restrictive covenants.43
The courts that created equitable servitudes based them on compet-
ing theories.' The first basis was contractual, and the purchaser with
notice was equitably bound to keep her word. The second basis was
founded in property theory, and the promise attached to the land and
bound purchasers with notice.45 Either way the result was the same.
A purchaser of land would not be permitted to use the land in a man-
ner inconsistent with an obligation the seller had accepted if the pur-
chaser had notice of the agreement." Thus, in the mid-nineteenth
century, English and U.S. courts enforced both restrictive covenants
and equitable servitudes, based, at least partially, on contract theory,
as a means to impose private restrictions on land while avoiding the
strict conveyancing rules of property law.
B. The Shift Towards Property Principles
While notice and restrictions on alienability continued to be the
paramount concerns of English courts regarding servitudes, in the
United States, notice was a diminishing concern. From the beginning
of European settlement in the United States, a public recording sys-
tem for land ownership and conveyances existed.47 A primary pur-
pose of the recording system was to provide notice of restrictions to
subsequent land purchasers.4 After the Civil War, reliance on the
43. Tulk, 41 Eng. Rep. at 1144-45.
44. Id.
45. Id An illustration of the difference between the contract and property theo-
ries is whether the law would enforce a servitude against an adverse possessor. Under
contract theory the servitude would not survive because no privity exists between the
adverse possessor and the parties to the agreement. Under property theory the servi-
tude should survive because it attaches to the land itself and a privity relationship
between the adverse possessor and the parties to the agreement is not necessary.
Reno, supra note 34, at 973-79.
46. Tulk, 41 Eng. Rep. at 1143.
A covenant between vendor and purchaser, on the sale of land, that the
purchaser and his assigns shall use or abstain from using the land in a partic-
ular way, will be enforced in equity against all subsequent purchasers with
notice, independently of the question whether it be one which runs with the
land so as to be binding upon subsequent purchasers at law.
Id.
47. 6A Richard W. Powell & Patrick J. Rohan, Powell on Real Property I
904[1](b) (1994) [hereinafter Powell]; Paul E. Basye, Trends and Progress-The Mar-
ketable Title Acts, 47 Iowa L. Rev. 261, 261 (1962) (citing a 1640 recording act of the
Massachusetts Bay Colony).
48. Corwin W. Johnson, Purpose and Scope of Recording Statutes, 47 Iowa L Rev.
231, 231 (1962).
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public recording system became the norm and the system proved
effective. 9
As a reliable system of recording land titles developed, it provided
notice to all land purchasers.5 0 Because the recordation of an interest
in land constitutes notice to the world as a whole, the prospective land
purchaser has the burden of checking the record for the particular
estate.5' Every state in the United States has an effective recording
system which addresses the concern over notice.52 Yet, despite the
development of these systems, U.S. courts retained many of the ves-
tiges of the English doctrines designed to "protect purchasers against
invisible servitudes. ' 53
The real concern remaining in the United States as it entered into
the twentieth century was not notice, but the social policy underlying
restrictions on the use of land. 4 Two schools of thought regarding
servitudes emerged. The first believed that allowing private land re-
strictions that would bind subsequent purchasers restricted alienability
and the free use of land and therefore was socially undesirable. 5 The
second viewed these restrictions as a type of private zoning that
tended to increase the value of land.5 6 Commentators criticized or
embraced servitudes according to their view of social policy.57
By the twentieth century, U.S. courts' attitudes towards servitudes
began to diverge, reflecting these disparate views.58 In many jurisdic-
tions, courts modified conveyancing rules and treated servitudes as
49. Dukeminier & Krier, 1981, supra note 19, at 965.
50. All recordation statutes share one vital feature: proper recording is deemed to
provide notice and binds all subsequent takers. Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Free-
dom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1353, 1356-57 (1982)
[hereinafter Epstein, Notice].
51. See, e.g., N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 291 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1995); Quinn v.
County of Nassau, 215 N.Y.S.2d 305 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (holding that the law charges a
landowner with notice, even in the absence of actual knowledge, and binds the land-
owner to a servitude where the original parties properly recorded it).
52. French, Ancient Strands, supra note 19, at 1284.
53. Id. at 1283.
54. See Powell & Rohan, supra note 29, at 716-17.
55. One of the leading proponents of this view was Oliver S. Rundell, the Re-
porter for the Restatement of Property. See Oliver S. Rundell, Judge Clark on the
American Law Institute's Law of Real Covenants: A Comment, 53 Yale L.. 312(1944).
56. 5 Powell, supra note 47, 674 (1987). Judge Clark was a champion of this
view. Clark, supra note 12, at 133-34.
57. Powell & Rohan, supra note 29, at 719 (noting that a commentator's position
supporting formalistic restrictions on servitudes generally reflects a view of servitudes
as potentially undesirable while a position which facilitates the creation and devolu-
tion of servitudes indicates a view of servitudes as socially useful).
58. In the early twentieth century, the debate between Charles E. Clark, a Second
Circuit judge, and Professor Oliver Rundell epitomized the "free choice/coercion di-
chotomy." Alexander, supra note 7, at 903-04.
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property interests rather than creatures of contract.5 9 This change in
outlook led to doctrinal limitations on the enforcement of servitudes,
such as privity of estate60 and the touch and concern doctrine.61 Like
the mid-nineteenth century judicial disfavor of private land restric-
tions, these limitations reflected concerns about the alienability of
land.62 The doctrines were not, however, clear tests for validity or
enforceability. Rather, they represented a framework within which
courts could apply policy based not on theory but on the perceived
social desirability of the outcome.6 3 As a result, the application of the
doctrines varied greatly from one U.S. jurisdiction to the next and
even within jurisdictions. 6
The confusion created by the varying restrictions6s on the different
forms of servitudes led to an evolution in property law that, by the
early 1900s, made restrictive covenants, equitable servitudes, and
easements largely interchangeable. 66 The former distinctions among
the types of servitudes deteriorated as courts applied both equitable
and legal principles to each.67 Courts often defined a restriction as
59. Reichman, supra note 13, at 1185-86. See, e.g., Neponsit Property Owners'
Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793, 796 (N.Y. 1938) (discussing the
distinction between personal and real covenants).
60. See infra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
61. Reichman, supra note 13, at 1185-86 (noting that at the turn of the twentieth
century, courts began to view restrictive covenants and equitable servitudes, originally
conceived of as contract devices, as property interests and began to subject them to
property requirements); see infra notes 93-99; see, e.g., Neponsit Property Owners'
Ass'n, 15 N.E.2d at 795 (requiring intent, touch and concern, and privity for a restric-
tive covenant to run with the land).
62. See e.g., Nicholson v. 300 Broadway Realty Corp., 164 N.E.2d 832, 834 (N.Y.
1959) (stating that the touch and concern doctrine is designed to prevent burdensome
encumbrances on title).
63. Reno, supra note 34, at 978; Reichman, supra note 13, at 1232-33 (finding that
by applying servitude restrictions courts are exercising discretion in fixing the bounda-
ries of servitudes).
64. See supra note 87 and accompanying text; see e.g., Powell & Rohan, supra
note 29, at 714 ("This basic question of social philosophy lies back of this whole topic
[(restrictions on promises running with the land)], although the decisions seldom re-
veal the fact."). Compare Mont. Code Ann. § 70-17-203 (1993) (providing that cove-
nants made for the direct benefit of an estate run with the land regardless of the touch
and concern doctrine) with Orange & Rockland Utils. v. Philwold Estates, 418 N.E.2d
1310, 1313 (N.Y. 1981) ("Whether a covenant restricting real property... runs with
the land depends on... whether the covenant touches and concerns the land....").
65. French, Structural Simplification, supra note 18, at 928 (quoting various de-
scriptions of servitude law such as: "the most complex and archaic body of American
property law remaining in the twentieth century," "an unspeakable quagmire," and a
"confounding intellectual experience[ ]").
66. Margot Rau, Note, Covenants Running With the Land Wable Doctrine or
Common-Law Relic?, 7 Hofstra L. Rev. 139, 178-80 (1978) (finding, through an ex-
tensive survey of case law, that American courts use the rules of the various servi-
tudes interchangeably).
67. Courts have misapplied the doctrine of restrictive covenants to cases involving
easements, interpreted restrictive covenants as equitable servitudes, and, in one case,
actually applied the law of restrictive covenants where there was no land with which
the covenant could run. Id. at 152-53.
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whichever type best supported the desired outcome.68 The formal dis-
tinctions persisted but became practically meaningless.69
In the early twentieth century, the American Law Institute began
work developing the Restatement of the Law of Property ("Restate-
ment").70 During the work on the Restatement's division on servi-
tudes, the competing views of the policy behind private land
restrictions collided.7' Despite lively debate both in the committee
and in academia, 72 the Restatement adopted a restrictive view of servi-
tudes and advocated giving the courts more discretion to invalidate
them.73 Many of the doctrines limiting the use of private land restric-
tions remain in effect today.
C. Current Common Law Servitude Restrictions
Restrictions on servitudes determine whether or not a covenant will
"run with the land;" 74 in other words, whether subsequent purchasers
of land will be bound by agreements made by previous owners con-
cerning the land will depend on whether the previous owners satisfied
certain requirements.75 The current limitations on the running of ser-
vitudes reflect the law's balancing of concerns regarding fair notice
and free alienability of land against concerns about landowners' free-
dom of contract.76
68. See Reichman, supra note 13, at 1250. For example, in an Ohio case where the
parties had neglected to record an easement the court allowed the plaintiff to reform
the deed to include the easement based on a finding that the easement ran with the
land. While the result was certainly equitable, the court applied the rules of restric-
tive covenants to an easement. Rau, supra note 66, at 152-53 (citing Berardi v. Ohio
Turnpike Comm'n, 205 N.E.2d 23 (Ohio Ct. App. 1965)).
69. Susan F. French, Design Proposal for the New Restatement of the Law of Prop-
erty-Servitudes, 21 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1213, 1223 (1988) (finding that current schol-
arship recognizes the conceptual identity and functional overlap of easements,
restrictive covenants, and equitable servitudes) [hereinafter French, Design Proposal].
70. Restatement, supra note 1.
71. Judge Clark and Professor Rundell were both involved in the American Law
Institute's Restatement of the Law of Property project. See Powell & Rohan, supra
note 29, at 716. Judge Clark believed private restrictions were generally socially desir-
able while Professor Rundell felt running restrictions impeded alienability and should
be limited. See Clark, supra note 12, at 133-34; Rundell, supra note 55 at 315.
72. See supra note 71.
73. Powell & Rohan, supra note 29, at 719 ("[T]he Restatement takes a position
which implicitly rests upon the potential undesirability of devolving burdens on
land.").
74. "A covenant is said to run with the land when either the liability to perform it
or the right to take advantage of it passes to the assignee of that land." Black's Law
Dictionary 1333 (6th ed. 1990).
75. See, e.g., Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 15
N.E.2d 793, 795 (N.Y. 1938) (finding that a covenant will run with the land and be
enforceable against subsequent purchasers "only if the covenant complies with certain
legal requirements").
76. Clark, supra note 12, at 72 ("It is not the novelty of an interest which makes it
objectionable. Rather it is the comparative inutility of the interest as contrasted with
its power to render titles unmarketable.").
[Vol. 64
SERVITUDE REFORM
To ensure that subsequent purchasers of land have notice of a servi-
tude and to protect the alienability of land, courts require that a servi-
tude meet three conditions in order to run with the land: theparties
must intend the covenant to run, the requisite privity of estate* must
exist between the parties, and the covenant must touch and concern
the land.78 While the test for intent is subjective, most U.S. courts
presume an express covenant provision for running indicates intent.79
Privity requirements and the touch and concern doctrine create condi-
tions a servitude must meet in order to bind successors to an inter-
est. 0 These requirements protect the interests of subsequent land
purchasers who have no notice and limit restraints on the alienability
of land." Furthermore, rather than invalidate a servitude from the
point when the estate transfers to a subsequent purchaser, courts may
employ the changed conditions doctrine2 to terminate the servitude
when it becomes outdated or ceases to serve its intended function.s
Privity of estate, which is distinct from privity of contract,~s de-
scribes a relationship between parties with an interest in an estatepas
The law intended that a familiar relationship would ensure that parties
had notice of any restrictions binding the land.8 Enforcement of a
servitude requires such a relationship. While privity requirements in
the United States have a complicated and confused history,8 many
77. Privity of estate is a mutual or successive property relationship between par-
ties and their assigns. Black's Law Dictionary 1199 (6th ed. 1990).
78. 5 Powell, supra note 47, 1 673[1]; see, e.g., Orange & Rockland Utils. v.
Philwold Estates, 418 N.E.2d 1310, 1313 (N.Y. 1981) (holding that for a covenant to
run with the land, the parties must have intended the covenant to run, privity of estate
must have existed between the parties, and the covenant must touch and concern the
land).
79. 5 Powell, supra note 47, 67312][b].
80. French, Ancient Strands, supra note 19, at 1304.
81. Wmokur, supra note 3, at 94 (noting that horizontal privity protected against
hindering alienability of land); see Reichman, supra note 13, at 1233-34.
82. The changed conditions doctrine allows courts to refuse to enforce a servitude
if conditions have changed since the making of the promise so much that a substantial
degree of the benefits no longer survive. Restatement, supra note 1, § 564.
83. Timothy C. Shepard, Comment, Tennination of Servitudes: Expanding the
Remedies for "Changed Conditions," 31 UCLA L Rev. 226,227 (1983) (defining the
doctrine of changed conditions as nonenforcement of land use restrictions when the
surrounding conditions render the restrictions obsolete); see, e.g., N.Y. Real Prop.
Acts. Law § 1951 (McKinney 1979) (stating that land use restrictions created by servi-
tude are not enforceable if the restriction is of no actual and substantial benefit to the
persons seeking enforcement because conditions have changed since the creation of
the servitude).
84. Privity of contract describes a connection in interest through the contract rela-
tion while privity of estate describes common interests in land burdened or benefitted
by a covenant. Clark, supra note 12, at 112.
85. Ran, supra note 66, at 144.
86. Reichman, supra note 13, at 1220.
87. Privity requirements were quite strict in the nineteenth century and differed
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Thus, some jurisdictions applied the strict English
form that allowed covenants imposing affirmative burdens to run only when created
in leases. Other jurisdictions followed the Massachusetts position that required a te-
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courts now apply relaxed privity standardsYs8 Currently, privity has
two forms, horizontal and vertical.89 Horizontal privity describes the
relationship between the original covenanting parties and requires
that they make the covenant in connection with the conveyance of a
fee estate;9' in other words, the covenant and conveyance must be
made simultaneously. 91 The second aspect, vertical privity, requires
that, in order for the covenant to be enforceable, the present owners
mut be successors to the same estate as the original owners who bene-
fited or were burdened by the covenant.' For example, if the previ-
ous owner of the dominant estate had a fee simple absolute, her
successor must also take a fee simple interest; if her successor takes
merely a life interest, the vertical privity requirement is unsatisfied.
Covenants must also "touch and concern" the land to bind subse-
quent purchasers.93 A predominant characteristic of the application
of the touch and concern rule is inconsistency.94 A majority of courts,
however, apply the Bigelow test:95 if the covenantor's legal interest in
the land is rendered less valuable, or the covenantee's legal interest
more valuable, then the covenant will run with the land.96 While the
test is oblique,97 the doctrine's function is clear: courts use the doc-
nurial relationship such as a lease or easement to allow running. Still other jurisdic-
tions used the American majority position which allowed a covenant to run if it was
created in the conveyance of a fee simple estate. French, Ancient Strands, supra note
19, at 1292-94.
88. The New York Court of Appeals noted:
Eventually the concept of privity of estate took on a different meaning and
now the party seeking to enforce the covenant need show only that he held
property descendant from the promisee which benefitted from the covenant
and that the owner of the servient parcel acquired it with notice of the
covenant.
Orange & Rockland Utils. v. Philwold Estates, 418 N.E.2d 1310, 1314 (N.Y. 1981);
see 5 Powell, supra note 47, 673[2][c] (stating that many jurisdictions have relaxed
the privity requirements).
89. 5 Powell, supra note 47, 673[2][c].
90. A fee estate is an estate of inheritance without condition, belonging to the
owner, and alienable by him or transmissible to his heirs absolutely and simply.
Black's Law Dictionary 615 (6th ed. 1990).
91. 5 Powell, supra note 47, 673[2][c]. The original purpose of the privity re-
quirement was to provide some sort of special relationship between parties to bypass
the rule against assigning the right to bring an action. Powell & Rohan, supra note 29,
at 713.
92. 5 Powell, supra note 47, 673[2][c].
93. Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 15 N.E.2d
793, 795 (N.Y. 1938).
94. Winokur, supra note 3, at 84-85.
95. 5 Powell, supra note 47, 673[2][a]. Professor Bigelow suggested the criteria
that form the test. Harry A. Bigelow, The Content of Covenants on Leases, 12 Mich.
L. Rev. 639 (1914).
96. Bigelow, supra note 95, at 645.
97. Commentators criticize Bigelow's touch and concern test for being circular in
reasoning. See Jeffrey E. Stake, Toward an Economic Understanding of Touch and
Concern, 1988 Duke L.J. 925, 929; James Krier, Book Review, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1664, 1678-79 (1974).
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trine to prevent the attachment of personal obligations to land that
may defeat efficient allocation and to control unreasonable affirma-
tive burdens and externalities that arise from servitudes.98 The doc-
trine is often used as an after-the-fact control device, allowing courts
discretion to invalidate servitudes. 9
Courts may also use the common law doctrine of changed condi-
tions to terminate challenged servitudes that no longer substantially
serve their intended purpose.100 In applying the doctrine, courts must
determine whether a party can possibly receive a substantial degree of
the servitude's original benefit.101 If so, courts are obliged to enforce
the servitude.'0 If a substantial degree of the agreement's original
benefit does not survive, the court may use the changed conditions
doctrine to declare the servitude unenforceable. 3 The doctrine thus
serves to void obsolete or unreasonable restrictions. 1°4
Many of the current common law limitations on servitudes devel-
oped more than one hundred years agons and were based on assump-
tions that are now obsolete or redundant: °6 In order to create an
efficient servitude law, the value of these doctrines must be evaluated
in light of current social and economic conditions. t °7
98. Paula A. Franzese, "Out of Toucit" The Diminished Viability of the Touch and
Concern Requirement in the Law of Servitudes, 21 Seton Hall L Rev. 235,250 (1991);
see, e.g., Jackson Hole Racquet Club Resort v. Teton Pines Ltd. Partnership, 839 P.2d
951, 957 (Wyo. 1992) (finding that an exclusive rights provision in a lease did not
touch and concern the land because it did not "purport to restrict in any way the use
or development of the property... and does not burden the property itself, but rather
restricts the contractual freedom of the present and future owners of the property
99. French, Structural Simplifcation, supra note 18, at 939.
100. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text. Some jurisdictions have imple-
mented changed conditions statutorily. See N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law § 1951 (Mc-
Kinney 1979); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 184, § 27 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
101. In determining whether a substantial benefit exists, courts consider the size of
the restricted area, the location of the changed conditions with respect to the re-
stricted area, the type of changed conditions, conduct of the parties and predecessors,
the intention of the original grantor, and the time remaining in the restriction. Shep-
ard, supra note 83, at 236-37.
102. See, e.g., Western Land Co. v. Truskolaski, 495 P.2d 624, 627 (Nev. 1972) (find-
ing that as long as a substantial part of the covenant's benefit can still be accom-
plished a covenant must be enforced); Rick v. West, 228 N.Y.S2d 195, 201 (Sup. CL.
1962) (enforcing a servitude in equity because it "afford[ed] real benefit to the person
seeking its enforcement").
103. Restatement, supra note 1, § 564; Komgold, supra note 18, at 557-58.
104. Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of
Servitude Restrictions, 70 Iowa L. Rev. 615, 652-53 (1985) [hereinafter Sterk, Freedom
from Freedom].
105. For example, the privity requirements for restrictive covenants were devel-
oped in the sixteenth century. Spencer's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B. 1583).
106. The recording system in the United States has made these doctrines' fair no-
tice function obsolete. French, Ancient Strands, supra note 19, at 1284.
107. Id. at 1300-02.
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II. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT SERVITUDE LAW
Real servitude law has evolved with changing social and economic
conditions. Recent commentary reflects a shift away from the nine-
teenth-century view reflected in the Restatement that servitudes di-
minish land values. 10 8 The widespread use of servitudes'0 9 has
persuaded courts and scholars that in many cases servitudes enhance
land values." 0 Unfortunately, because current servitude law devel-
oped under the now rejected view that private restrictions on the use
of land are socially undesirable,"' servitude law is unnecessarily com-
plicated. The development of doctrinally separate devices to accom-
plish similar and overlapping objectives indicates that the
development was more historical than logical or essential."12 Today,
with U.S. society viewing servitudes as desirable, restrictive servitude
law, developed in eras less receptive to servitudes, creates confu-
sion." 3 Inconsistencies in the application and operation of servitude
law make it increasingly apparent that the current law is in need of
reform." 4 This section analyzes the problems arising from the doc-
trines of privity, touch and concern, and changed conditions.
108. 5 Powell, supra note 47, 674.
109. Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) at xix (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1989) [hereinafter Restatement T.D.1]; French, Ancient Strands, supra note 19, at
1318 ("Private land use arrangements are increasingly common and useful in the
modem world.").
110. Courts have begun to question the public policy justification for strict con-
struction of servitudes because they act as private zoning schemes, 5 Powell, supra
note 47, 674, generally tending to maintain or enhance the value and alienability of
the property involved. Winokur, supra note 3, at 15.
111. Winokur, supra note 3, at 14 ("Promissory servitudes restricting land use, ear-
lier disdained in a property-dominated society as title encumbrances hindering aliena-
bility, came to enjoy recognition in the service of an expanded, modem market in
which land-related contract obligations (alternatively conceived of as fractionated
property rights) were recognized as transferable commodities."); see also French, An-
cient Strands, supra note 19, at 1318 (commenting on the increased use of private land
use arrangements in the modem world).
112. French, Ancient Strands, supra note 19, at 1264-65.
113. See generally Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n. v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank,
15 N.E.2d 793, 795 (N.Y. 1938) (finding the touch and concern test too vague to be of
much assistance); Clark, supra note 12, at 96 (stating that expressing any absolute
tests as to what touches and concerns the land and what does not is impossible); 5
Powell, supra note 47, 673[2] n.113 (recognizing the confusion in manyjurisdictions).
114. The Southern California Law Review 1982 Symposium issue focused on pro-
posals for reforming servitude law. 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1177 (1982). Articles and Com-
ments include French, Ancient Strands, supra note 19; Reichman, supra note 13;
Curtis J. Berger, Comment, Some Reflections on a Unified Law of Servitudes, 55 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 1323 (1982) [hereinafter C. Berger]; L. Berger, supra note 35; Allison
Dunham, Comment, Statutory Reformation of Land Obligations, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1345 (1982); Epstein, Notice, supra note 50; Bernard E. Jacob, Comment, The Law of
Definite Elements: Land in Exceptional Packages, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1369 (1982);
Carol M. Rose, Comment, Servitudes, Security, and Assent. Some Comments on
Professors French and Reichman, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1403 (1982); and Michael F.
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A. Privity
Despite its practical obsolescence, the privity requirement remains
a nominal restriction on servitude creation. This section discusses the
requirement's original purpose and how developments in U.S. law
have made it superfluous.
1. Horizontal Privity
Perhaps the most criticized aspect of servitude law is the require-
ment of horizontal privity, which demands a specific relationship be-
tween the original covenanting parties. 15 The fundamental concern
underlying horizontal privity is fair notice of burdens that bind subse-
quent purchasers.116 While notice was a significant concern in nine-
teenth-century England, the establishment of a workable and
comprehensive recording system in the United States rendered hori-
zontal privity obsolete. 17 The general consensus among courts and
commentators is that no sound basis for horizontal privity remains."18
Privity is designed to furnish a link between parties. Because the link
already exists between the original parties by virtue of the promise,
some commentators question whether horizontal privity ever served
any purpose other than as a technical vehicle for reform.119 Certainly,
the requirement has outlived any purpose it once served."z
Unfortunately, horizontal privity requirements have not proven an
effective tool for reform. Varying definitions among, and even within,
jurisdictions' 2 ' have led to confusion and ambiguity in its applica-
tion.22 This ambiguity makes it difficult for parties to a servitude to
be sure exactly what the privity requirement is and whether or not
Sturley, Comment, The "Land Obligation" An English Proposal for Reform, 55 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 1417 (1982).
115. 5 Powell, supra note 47, 67312][c].
116. See French, Ancient Strands, supra note 19, at 1292; see supra note 86 and
accompanying text.
117. Olin L. Browder, Running Covenants and Public Policy, 77 Mich. L Rev. 12,
16 (1979) (stating that American recording statutes make the horizontal privity re-
quirement obsolete); Richard A. Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CorneU L
Rev. 906, 909 (1988) (-[T]he recording system renders unnecessary many of the ar-
cane features of the law of covenants that might have made sense in the prior age.")
[hereinafter Epstein, Covenants].
118. French, Design Proposal, supra note 69, at 1222-23; L Berger, supra note 35,
at 195; Reichman, supra note 13, at 1219-20.
119. Clark, supra note 12, at 131-37; Reichman, supra note 13, at 1219-20.
120. French, Design Proposal, supra note 69, at 1223 ("No contemporary writers
argue that technical roadblocks to servitude creation are appropriate .... ").
121. 5 Powell, supra note 47, 673[2][c] n.113.
122. See Browder, supra note 118, at 23; French, Ancient Strands, supra note 19, at
1292-94. Compare Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 15
N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1938) (avoiding privity requirements altogether by enforcing a cove-
nant as a lien) with Eagle Enter. v. Gross, 349 N.E2d 816 (N.Y. 1976) (requiring
horizontal privity) and Orange & Rockland Utils. v. Philwold Estates, 418 N.B2d
1310 (N.Y. 1981) (requiring vertical privity only).
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they meet it."2 For example, in the case of Holland and the Electric
Company, 124 a requirement of horizontal privity puts an additional
onus of investigation on Holland." - The burden may be particularly
heavy because she cannot be sure how a court will interpret this re-
quirement. 26 Uncertainty as to whether or not the covenant is en-
forceable may discourage Holland from purchasing the estate. 27
Both Holland and the Electric Company had notice of the restriction
on the servient estate through the recording system. Horizontal priv-
ity adds nothing to the question of notice or intent that is not provided
by the recordation. 28
Horizontal privity requirements can also raise transaction costs as
parties resort to straw transfers 29 and other innovations to circum-
vent the privity requirements. 3 ° These legal acrobatics increase both
the time and expense of transferring land and inhibit its efficient
use.' 3' The exact number of jurisdictions currently requiring horizon-
tal privity is unknown because of a lack of consistency in court appli-
cations. 32 Because of the establishment of an effective recording
system to provide notice, however, most legal scholars and many juris-
dictions agree that horizontal privity is obsolete. 33
2. Vertical Privity
Despite the Restatement's justification of vertical privity as a
method to keep the running of burdens within narrow limits,"3 the
vertical privity requirement is also a major deficiency of servitude
123. Shepard, supra note 83, at 242 (stating that by demanding form at the expense
of substance, the law cannot provide adequate guidance for landowners).
124. See supra p. 661.
125. Holland must ensure that she meets the horizontal privity required in the juris-
diction. Depending on the jurisdiction, this requirement could vary from requiring a
strict English form to the American majority form. See supra note 87.
126. There is confusion in many jurisdictions as to what type of privity of estate, if
any, is required for covenants to run. 5 Powell, supra note 47, 1 673[2][c] n.113; see
supra note 87 (explaining varying privity requirements).
127. Vagueness as to the covenant's enforceability creates ambiguity as to the value
of the estate. Needless ambiguity regarding estate value distorts the marketplace and
deprives parties of the information they need to make informed decisions. This dis-
tortion can frustrate the estate's sale, thus restricting alienability and violating the
very purpose of the privity requirement. See Epstein, Notice, supra note 50, at 1363
(stating that if a party is uncertain as to whether a servitude will survive, they will take
"evasive action" which can include avoiding an estate transaction).
128. Browder, supra note 118, at 16-17.
129. A straw transfer is where A transfers the property to B who transfers it back
to A with the desired covenant, thus meeting the privity requirement. Clark, supra
note 12, at 117.
130. Restatement T.D.1, supra note 109, at xix.
131. See French, Ancient Strands, supra note 19, at 1292-93.
132. 5 Powell, supra note 47, 673[2][c].
133. IML; French, Structural Simplification, supra note 18, at 934-35; Reichman,
supra note 13, at 1220-21.
134. Restatement, supra note 1, § 535 cmt. a.
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law.'3 Vertical privity requires that the successor to a covenant hold
an estate of the same duration as the promisor held at the time of
making the promise."3 This requirement prevents a dominant estate
from enforcing a covenant against a sublessor of a servient estate.1"
If the Electric Company, for example, had leased the land to a third
party, vertical privity would prevent Holland from enforcing the servi-
tude against the lessee.'38 Her only recourse would be against the
Electric Company. The result is unfair because covenant beneficiaries
have no control over transactions concerning the servient estate.
Therefore, their rights should not be affected by the servient estate's
owner transactions.139
Vertical privity is designed to furnish a link between the parties so
that their rights and duties can pass to successive owners. 140 That link,
however, is already provided in the U.S. recording system.' 41 The no-
tice of a recorded covenant, not the privity requirement, is the justifi-
cation for binding subsequent purchasers to a covenant regarding the
estate.142 Vertical privity seems to be simply a vestige of the ancient
English requirement of a link between the transferor and trans-
feree,143 made obsolete by an effective recording system. The require-
ment has no defensible public policy basis in the United States, where
servitudes are not considered objectionable. 1 " Not surprisingly, many
modem courts avoid applying the vertical privity requirement.1 45
Where they do, they have relaxed the requirement to the point that
135. Reichman, supra note 13, at 1249.
136. Restatement, supra note 1, § 535 CM a.
137. Because a lessee's estate ends at a specific time, it is not of the same durational
value as the fee holder's estate. Thus, the lessee does not hold an estate of the same
durational value as the promisor, the fee holder, held at the time of making the cove-
nant. See French, Ancient Strands, supra note 19, at 1294-95.
138. The Electric Company's fee simple estate lasts as long as the Electric Com-
pany exists or until the company transfers it. The durational value is infinite. If the
Electric Company leases the land, the lessee's estate is for a fixed period; the dura-
tional value of the two estates are not the same. Vertical privity would prevent Hol-
land from enforcing the servitude against the lessee because the two estates, the
Electric Company's and the lessee's, are not of the same durational value. See id.
139. Reichman, supra note 13, at 1250.
140. See Clark, supra note 12, at 116-17.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. 5 Powell, supra note 47, 1 673[2][c].
144. Browder, supra note 118, at 26; see also L. Berger, supra note 35, at 190-93
(discussing the policy arguments for and against vertical privity).
145. Reichman, supra note 13, at 1250 ("Fortunately, the vertical privity rule is not
often applied. By calling the land obligation an equitable servitude or negative ease-
ment, the rule is simply avoided.").
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any recordable interest will suffice.'46 Additionally, many legal com-
mentators suggest that vertical privity be abolished altogether. 147
B. Touch and Concern
Scholars and judges criticize the touch and concern doctrine on
many fronts: it frustrates the express intent of parties, it is vague and
arbitrary, and it is redundant.148 Despite criticism and efforts to abol-
ish the doctrine, 49 it persists.' 50 Perhaps the strongest criticism is that
the doctrine is vague.15' The body of case law applying the require-
ment illustrates the confusion in its interpretation. 52 Even the major-
ity rule, the Bigelow test, 53 reflects the doctrine's obscurity. 54 The
test states that if a covenant increases the legal interest of a dominant
146. See, e.g., Orange & Rockland Utils. v. Philwold Estates, 418 N.E.2d 1310, 1314
(N.Y. 1981) (defining privity as requiring that "the party seeking to enforce the cove-
nant need show only that he held property descendant from the promisee which bene-
fited from the covenant and that the owner of the servient parcel acquired it with
notice of the covenant").
147. See Rau, supra note 66, at 148-49 (suggesting the abolishment of vertical priv-
ity); Reichman, supra note 13, at 1249-52 (noting the arbitrary nature of vertical priv-
ity and advocating discontinuing its use).
148. Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 3.2 cnt. b (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 1991) [hereinafter Restatement T.D.2]; Davidson Bros. v. D. Katz & Sons, 579
A.2d 288, 295 (NJ. 1990) ("The time has come to cut the gordian knot that binds...
jurisprudence regarding covenants running with the land. Rigid adherence to the
'touch and concern' test as a means of determining the enforceability of a restrictive
covenant is not warranted.").
149. The proposed Restatement (Third) of Property would abolish the touch and
concern doctrine. Restatement T.D.2, supra note 148, at § 3.2.
150. Restatement, supra note 1, § 537; see, e.g., Chesapeake Ranch Club, Inc. v.
C.R.C. United Members, Inc., 483 A2d 1334, 1337-38 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984)
(finding that a covenant did not touch and concern the land and, therefore, did not
run with the land); Orange & Rockland Utils. v. Philwold Estates, 418 N.E.2d 1310,
1313 (N.Y. 1981) (stating that a covenant must touch and concern the land to run with
the land).
151. Davidson Bros., 579 A.2d at 294-95 ("Reasonableness, not esoteric concepts
of property law, should be the guiding inquiry into the validity of covenants at law.");
Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n. v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793, 795
(N.Y. 1938) ("In truth such a description or test so formulated is too vague to be of
much assistance.... ."); Clark, supra note 12, at 96 ("It has been found impossible to
state any absolute tests to determine what covenants touch and concern land and
what do not.").
152. Restatement T.D.2, supra note 148, § 3.2 cmt. b; see, e.g., Rossi v. Simms, 506
N.Y.S.2d 50, 52-53 (App. Div. 1986) (confusing the application of the touch and con-
cern requirement with the distinction between burdens and benefits). Compare Ches-
apeake Ranch Club, Inc., 483 A.2d at 1337-38 (finding that a covenant to pay
membership dues for the use of social and recreational facilities did not run with the
land while a covenant to pay for road maintenance did) with Four Seasons Homeown-
ers Ass'n v. W.K. Sellers, 302 S.E.2d 848, 852 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that a
covenant to pay for maintenance and beautification of common areas does touch and
concern the land).
153. 5 Powell, supra note 47, 673[2][a]. Professor Bigelow suggested the criteria
that form the test. Bigelow, supra note 95.
154. Dukeminier & Krier, 1981, supra note 19, at 1037 n.56 (discussing the appar-
ent circular nature of the Bigelow test).
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estate or diminishes the legal interest of a servient estate, it touches
and concerns the land.155 The test's circular reasoning is apparent: Of
course an estate's legal interest or value will be affected if the court
finds that a covenant runs with the land. 6 In effect, the doctrine is a
judicial tool enabling courts to discretionally void servitudes."5
The touch and concern "concept is so difficult to pin down that it
can rarely be used as a basis for predicting enforceability of a particu-
lar covenant."15 This ambiguity leads to instability in the land mar-
ket, which in turn creates higher front-end transaction costs as parties
resort to other means to ensure that a servitude will survive, such as
selling with a right of first refusal.' 9 The uncertainty can also result in
restrictions on alienability, because parties may decide not to sell
rather than risk that their intent is not given effect.11 Thus, the doc-
trine may prevent, rather than promote, the social goal of efficient
allocation of land. 61
A second criticism is that the doctrine frustrates the intent of the
parties to a covenant. 62 By creating an artificial barrier to servitudes,
155. Id.; see also Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n, 15 N.E.2d at 796 (noting that
Bigelow's test is based on the effects of a covenant on an estate).
156. See Stake, supra note 97, at 929 (noting that commentators criticize Bigelow's
touch and concern test as circular in reasoning). For example, a covenant not to com-
pete may or may not effect the legal interest in an estate. If the court finds that it
does not run with the land, it will not effect the legal interest; however, if the court
finds that it does run with the land, it will effect the legal interest. See, e.g., Shell Oil
Co. v. Henry Ouellette & Sons, Co., 227 N.E.2d 509, 512 (Mass. 1967) (discussing
whether a covenant not to compete touches and concerns an estate).
157. See, e.g., Franzese, supra note 98, at 250 (noting that the touch and concern
requirement was "largely a juristic answer" to the early public policy disfavoring
servitudes).
158. French, Structural Simplification, supra note 18, at 939.
159. Epstein, Notice, supra note 50, at 1361-63. The ambiguity of the touch and
concern doctrine forces parties to evaluate the requirement in each case and attempt
to meet it. Parties often have to redraft and restructure transactions to avoid a future
invalidation of the servitude, all at a dead weight cost because the doctrine serves no
valid function. Id. at 1361; see also Restatement T.D.1, supra note 109, at xix-xx (ad-
vocating modification and termination controls on servitudes rather than creation re-
strictions such as the touch and concern requirement).
160. Epstein, Notice, supra note 50, at 1363.
161. The costs that the doctrine creates are dead weight costs because they do not
produce a benefit and they distort the value of land. Restatement T.D.2, supra note
148, § 32 reporter's note ("More recently, the touch and concern doctrine has been
attacked on the ground that it creates dead weight losses by increasing front end
transaction costs ....").
162. Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and
Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Chi. L Rev. 681, 717 (1973); French, Ancient
Strands, supra note 19, at 1306-10 (finding that the touch and concern doctrine endan-
gers the intent of the parties to a servitude); Epstein, Notice, supra note 50, at 1360
("Insistence upon the touch and concern requirement denies the original parties their
contractual freedom .... "); see Davidson Bros. v. D. Katz & Sons, 579 A2d 288,295(NJ. 1990) (finding the touch and concern doctrine to be too esoteric and opting
instead to evaluate servitudes by reasonableness, the primary consideration of which
is the parties' intent).
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the touch and concern requirement prevents parties from carrying out
their intentions. 63 Arbitrary prohibition of certain types of servitudes
frustrates servitude law's primary function-ascertaining and giving
effect to parties' intent."6 Perhaps the best indication of dissatisfac-
tion with the touch and concern doctrine is that many U.S. courts and
reformers have chosen to abandon it,' 65 turning instead to contract
remedies such as unconscionability, estoppel and modification, or the
changed conditions doctrine. 16 6
C. Changed Conditions
Many courts turn to the doctrine of changed conditions to control
servitudes. 67 This doctrine allows courts to terminate servitudes,
rather than invalidate them, if conditions of the original promise have
changed in a manner that makes a substantial degree of the intended
benefits impossible to achieve.' 68 Courts apply the doctrine as a way
to correct a lack of foresight on the part of the original parties to the
covenant. 169 The courts reason that if the circumstances surrounding
the covenant have changed so much that the benefit is no longer real-
izable, the original intent of the parties is no longer served and the
servitude should be terminated.17 0 Although this doctrine enjoys sup-
port in many jurisdictions, both judicially and statutorily,' 7' in practice
163. Franzese, supra note 98, at 242 (finding that the touch and concern require-
ment "displaces bargained-for duties and entitlements"); Epstein, Notice, supra note
50, at 1359 (noting that the touch and concern requirement acts as a barrier to the
unambiguous intent of the parties).
164. The primary function of servitude law is to give effect to parties' intent, "not to
force them into one transactional form rather than another." Restatement T.D.1,
supra note 109, at xix.
165. Sterk, Freedom From Freedom, supra note 104, at 649 n.141 (stating that a
survey of New York, New Jersey, and California cases between 1975 and 1985 indi-
cates only one case in which a court used the touch and concern requirement to invali-
date a restriction intended to run).
166. See Restatement T.D.1, supra note 109, at xix; Restatement T.D.2, supra note
148, § 3.2 cmt. b. But see Reichman, supra note 13, at 1232-33 (noting reasons for
retaining the touch and concern requirement); Sterk, Freedom From Freedom, supra
note 104, at 648 (stating that the touch and concern requirement eliminates many of
the problems of a pure freedom of contract approach).
167. See French, Design Proposal, supra note 69, at 1220.
168. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text; Restatement, supra note 1,
§ 564; see, e.g., N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law § 1951 (McKinney 1979) (implementing
changed conditions statutorily).
169. See Stewart E. Sterk, Foresight and the Law of Servitudes, 73 Cornell L. Rev.
956, 960-61 (1988) [hereinafter Sterk, Foresight] (discussing the general lack of fore-
sight of contracting parties).
170. 2 American Law of Property § 9.22 (A. James Casner ed., 1952); see, e.g., Or-
ange & Rockland Utils. v. Philwold Estates, 418 N.E.2d 1310, 1314-15 (N.Y. 1981)
(holding that if a covenant's benefit is not actually and substantially obtainable, the
covenant should be extinguished).
171. N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law § 1951 (McKinney 1979); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 184,
§ 27 (Law. Co-op. 1987); see, e.g., Orange & Rockland Utils., 418 N.E.2d at 1314-15
(invalidating a covenant based on the changed conditions doctrine); Mountain Park
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it can be an inefficient and arbitrary method of terminating
servitudes.172
The changed conditions doctrine's inefficient and arbitrary imple-
mentation arises because the rule is vague.173 The types of changes
that suffice to trigger the doctrine are unclear.174 For example, courts
disagree as to whether a specific duration term in a covenant influ-
ences the application of changed conditions. 75 The doctrine also de-
pends on the discretion of judges176 who arbitrarily draw a line as to
when benefits are no longer substantial enough to require the continu-
ance of the servitude. 77 Because of the manipulability of the concept
of "substantial" benefit, the changed conditions analysis often de-
pends on the individual judge's view of justice. 78 The confusion sur-
rounding the doctrine, along with the courts' discretion, creates
unpredictability. 79 Because of this unpredictability, the doctrine of-
fers little guidance to parties making a covenant 80 which, in turn, de-
stabilizes the property market.18 ' Thus, the changed conditions
doctrine can defeat an underlying purpose of servitude law-the effi-
cient use of land.1 2
Another problem with applying the changed conditions doctrine to
terminate a servitude is that it may frustrate the intent of the parties
to a covenant8s3 A recorded servitude is evidence of the original par-
Homeowners Ass'n v. Tydings, 883 P.2d 1383,1386 (Wash. 1994) (stating that changed
conditions is an equitable defense that can preclude enforcement of a covenant).
172. See Epstein, Notice, supra note 50, at 1364-65; Clark, supra note 12, at 185-86;
Wmokur, supra note 3, at 38-40; Shepard, supra note 83, at 240, 242.
173. Shepard, supra note 83, at 242.
174. Compare Western Land Co. v. Truskolaski, 495 P.2d 624 (Nev. 1972) (applying
changed conditions as frustration of purpose, and examining whether it is still possible
to receive the benefits of the covenant) with Loeb v. Watkins, 240 A.2d 513 (Pa. 1968)
(holding that a benefit to those seeking to enforce the covenant is unnecessary for
enforcement) and Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 184, § 30 (Law. Co-op. 1987) (requiring the
application of a test that balances the benefits and burdens of a covenant for changed
conditions analysis).
175. See Winokur, supra note 3, at 40. Compare Norris v. Williams, 54 A2d 331
(Md. 1947) (using changed conditions to terminate a servitude before its express expi-
ration date) with Crissman v. Dedakis, 330 So. 2d 103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (fo-
cusing on the importance of express termination dates).
176. Wmokur, supra note 3, at 40.
177. See, e.g., Redfem Lawns Civic Ass'n v. Currie Pontiac Co., 44 N.W2d 8, 11
(Mich. 1950) (stating that "there must of necessity be a dividing line somewhere"); St.
Lo Constr. Co. v. Koenigsberger, 174 F.2d 25,28 (D.C Cir. 1949) ("[I]f the restriction
be lifted from this particular property, the next adjoining residential property would
then be the recipient of the same harsh treatment."), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 821 (1949).
178. Clark, supra note 12, at 185.
179. Id.
180. Shepard, supra note 83, at 240-41.
181. Epstein, Covenants, supra note 117, at 913.
182. Rose, supra note 114, at 1416 ("[A] 'changed circumstance' doctrine may very
well frustrate one of the underlying purposes of servitude law-to secure efficient
land development.").
183. Epstein, Notice, supra note 50, at 1364-65.
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ties' intent."8 Subsequent purchasers of estates bound by a servitude
that runs with the land are bound by the intent embodied in the origi-
nal agreement.18 5 The original parties create servitudes at some ex-
pense to serve a mutual benefit extending over several generations
and they could, if they so intended, include a termination trigger or a
changed conditions clause.'8 6 A court invoking the changed condi-
tions doctrine to terminate a covenant replaces the express writing of
the parties with its own idea of the parties' intent, often without sub-
stantial evidence of that intent.'8 7
Additionally, in jurisdictions that apply a balancing test,' , courts
may ignore intent and skew the result in favor of large landholders
because the more valuable interest carries more weight.189 For exam-
ple, in Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc. v. Philwold Estates, Inc.,190
the court held that "The issue is not whether [the dominant estate]
obtains any benefit from the existence of the restriction but whether
in a balancing of equities it can be said to be, in the wording of the
statute, 'of no actual and substantial benefit.' ",91 This type of test
tends to make the decision whether to terminate a servitude depend
upon a comparison of the values of the estates which creates a bias
towards large property holders.'"
A problem discrete from the ambiguity of the changed conditions
doctrine is that it can act as a disincentive to settlement. Many courts
interpret the doctrine as prohibiting damages,193 reasoning that a ser-
vitude invalidated in equity does not exist anymore and has no
184. Id. at 1365.
185. See Epstein, Covenants, supra note 118. Professor Epstein analogizes servi-
tudes to constitutions. He argues that "[t]he central problem with both is to find a
way to bind a large number of persons to a common plan for their mutual good ex-
tending over several generations." Id. at 926.
186. See Epstein, Notice, supra note 50, at 1364-68.
187. See id. at 1365-66.
188. Some state statutes provide for a balancing of the interests between the domi-
nant and servient estates in order to determine if conditions have changed sufficiently
to warrant a termination of a servitude. See, e.g., Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 184, § 30 (Law.
Co-op. 1987) (providing for a balancing of interests in determining the effect of
changed conditions).
189. Clark, supra note 12, at 185 ("[Balancing of the equities] tends to make the
outcome depend on a comparison of the value of the interests of plaintiff and defend-
ant, and thus effects a preference to large property holders before the law, which has
distinct social disadvantages.").
190. 418 N.E.2d 1310 (N.Y. 1981).
191. 1I at 1315 (quoting N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law § 1951 (McKinney 1979)).
192. See supra note 190.
193. 5 Powell, supra note 47, 679[2]. Courts disagree as to whether damages can
be awarded when a servitude is unenforceable in equity. Compare Booker v. Old
Dominion Land Co., 49 S.E.2d 314, 320 (Va. 1948) and St. Lo Constr. Co. v. Koenig-
sberger, 174 F.2d 25, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (finding that damage awards are governed by
the same criteria as equitable relief) with Cassidy v. Stuart V. Richards, Inc. 327
N.Y.S.2d 752, 755 (App. Div. 1971) (finding damage awards are available even when
equitable relief is not).
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residual interest meriting a damage award.194 If a court finds that con-
ditions have changed sufficiently to activate the doctrine, it will usu-
ally terminate the servitude;195 if not, the court will issue an injunction
enforcing the servitude.19 6 Even though damages may be available,197
courts rarely award them when a servitude is unenforceable at eq-
uity.198 This interpretation creates an all-or-nothing remedy which
can result in harsh and inefficient results in borderline cases.19 In the
example of Holland and the Electric Company, ° if the court under-
stood the changed conditions doctrine to disallow damages, it could
not provide Holland with any compensation for the invalidation of her
benefit, even though some very real interest existed. The extreme na-
ture of the all-or-nothing remedy also reduces the incentive to settle.
While parties who feel courts will award damages or impose a com-
promise have an incentive to settle and avoid litigation costs, parties
who feel they may achieve complete victory will insist on litigation if
their case is even marginally better than their opponent's 01
Despite the shortcomings of the changed conditions doctrine, some
commentators justify its use as a way to rid the market of "hold-
outs." 2 The argument postulates that a holdout can force a servient
estate to pay more than the market value of the servitude. If these
demands are not met, the holdout threatens to let the servitude con-
tinue,203 which will result in a restraint of the alienability of the
land.2°' The changed conditions doctrine can circumvent the problem
194. See St. Lo Constr. Co., Inc., 174 F.2d at 27 (finding that damages cannot be
recovered on a covenant deemed unenforceable at equity because the validity and
enforceability are intrinsically linked).
195. Shepard, supra note 83, at 243.
196. 1&.; see, e.g., Deak v. Heatheote Ass'n, 595 N.Y.S.2d 556 (App. Div. 1993)(affirming a lower court's enforcement of a servitude because the plaintiff failed to
prove that the servitude was of no actual and substantial benefit due to changed
conditions).
197. See, e.g., N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law § 1951 (McKinney 1979) (providing for
damages to a party who would otherwise be entitled to enforcement of a servitude
when a court invalidates the servitude by applying the changed conditions doctrine).
198. Shepard, supra note 83, at 243.
199. Id. at 238-40.
200. See supra p. 661.
201. See Ellickson, supra note 162, at 717.
202. See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 13, at 1233 (arguing that judicial termination of
obsolete servitudes furthers efficiency by preventing beneficiaries of the servitude
from extracting "blackmail" money from the party subject to the servitude).
203. Judge Posner explained the concept of a holdout:
[I]f homeowners have a right to be free from pollution the factory that
wishes to acquire the right to pollute must acquire it from every homeowner.
If only one out of a thousand refuses to come to terms, the rights that the
factory has purchased from the other 999 are worth nothing (why?) Because
the holdout can extract an exorbitant price .... each homeowner has an
incentive to delay coming to terms with the factory; the process of negotia-
tion may therefore be endlessly protracted.
Posner, supra note 30, § 3.8, at 62-63.
204. See Reichman, supra note 13, at 1233.
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by invalidating the servitude so the holdout no longer has an inter-
est.205 This justification, however, ignores the property right of the
holdout.2 °6 Ownership, in the context of the fee simple, means a right
to hold out. 07 If the court invalidates a property right without com-
pensation, it raises the issue of private takings.20 8
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORmING SERVITUDE LAW
Reformers offer a variety of solutions to the shortcomings of cur-
rent servitude law. While certain proposals enjoy unanimous ap-
proval, the reform movements disagree as to what control courts
should wield over private land use arrangements. This part first dis-
cusses unifying servitudes under a single body of law. It then exam-
ines the current trend toward abolishing formalistic creation
restrictions such as privity requirements and the touch and concern
doctrine. 0 9 Commentators agree that unifying servitude law and
abolishing creation restrictions would create a clearer, more effective
body of law.210 Once servitude law reform eradicates the barriers to
servitude creation, however, courts will still require a method to vindi-
cate the public policy concerns of freedom of alienation and freedom
of land use.21 ' Thus, this part also suggests providing courts with the
necessary authority to modify and terminate obsolete servitudes by
narrowing the scope of the changed conditions doctrine, statutorily
205. See French, Ancient Strands, supra note 19, at 1316-17.
206. Rose, supra note 114, at 1411-13.
207. Epstein, Covenants, supra note 117, at 920 (noting that although this right to
holdout is not absolute, "the ability of private parties to 'take and pay' is sharply
limited.").
208. See D. Benjamin Barros, Defining "Property" in the Just Compensation Clause,
63 Fordham L. Rev. 1853, 1874-78 (1995) (arguing that court actions that destroy
property rights should be considered takings of private property); see generally Bar-
ton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1449 (1990) (discussing the just
compensation implications of court actions that destroy property rights).
209. Restrictions on the creation of servitudes generally fall into two categories,
formalistic and substantive. Formalistic restrictions are the doctrines developed at
common law to discourage servitudes. They include privity requirements and the
touch and concern doctrines. Substantive restrictions are general theories of law that
make certain servitudes illegal. For example, a covenant not to sell an estate to mem-
bers of a particular racial group would violate the Constitution's equal protection
provisions and courts would nullify it ab initio. See French, Design Proposal, supra
note 69, at 1222, 1229-30.
210. Commentators have reached a consensus that formalistic restrictions on the
creation of servitudes should not exist.
No contemporary writers argue that technical roadblocks to servitude crea-
tion are appropriate, although most still believe that a need exists for some
form of judicial or legislative control. Nearly all recent scholarship agrees
that the law can be simplified by recognizing easements, covenants, and eq-
uitable servitudes as functionally overlapping devices that can be conceptu-
alized under a single body of legal doctrine.
Id. at 1223.
211. Id. at 1220.
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limiting servitude life, and expanding the remedies available for deal-
ing with obsolete or unreasonable servitudes.
A. Unifying Servitudes
Many reform approaches advocate the unification of restrictive cov-
enants, equitable servitudes, and easements under a single umbrella
concept of servitudes.2 2 The tendency in many courts to use these
various concepts interchangeably213 indicates that this reform is al-
ready occurring. Because servitudes appear in the same documents
and often serve the same functions,214 a single body of law should ap-
ply to create predictability in their application 1 5 Predictability helps
achieve one of servitude law's primary goals-to give effect to the
intent of parties.20 1 6 The only disagreement among current reform
movements is what the content of the uniform rules should be.
B. Abolishing Creation Restrictions
Most servitude reform movements advocate abolishing the horizon-
tal privity requirement.21 7 Again, case law shows a movement in this
direction already.21 8
Some reformers advocate retaining the vertical privity requirement
in cases of a burden running with land.21 9 The argument is that a
lesser interest than the original estate should not be bound by a bur-
den on the estate because binding the lesser interest would not be
212. Id. at 1223-24; Restatement T.D.1, supra note 109, at xxiii; Epstein, Notice,
supra note 50, at 1353; Reichman, supra note 13, at 1182; Jacob, supra note 114, at
1369-70.
213. Rau, supra note 66, at 178-79 (finding, through an extensive survey of case
law, that American courts use the rules of the various servitudes interchangeably).
214. Reichman, supra note 13, at 1182 (stating that American courts often use re-
strictive covenant, easement, and equitable servitude classifications interchangeabl,
choosing one classification over another based on the result the court wants to reach).
215. Unification of restrictive covenants, equitable servitudes, and easements under
the single legal concept of servitudes would allow a single body of law to apply.
French, Ancient Strands, supra note 19, at 1304; Restatement T.D.1, supra note 109, at
xxiii; Reichman, supra note 13, at 1230.
216. Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) xvii (Tentative Draft No. 4,
1994).
217. See, e.g., French, Ancient Strands, supra note 19, at 1294 ("It is difficult to
divine any useful purpose served by [horizontal privity."]); Restatement T.D.1, supra
note 109, at xxxii; Reichman, supra note 13, at 1221-22 (advocating the abolishment of
the horizontal privity requirement); Wmokur, supra note 3, at 95 (arguing that while
horizontal privity served a purpose at one point, it no longer does).
218. See, e.g., Orange & Rockland Utils. v. Philwold Estates, 418 N.E.2d 1310,1314
(N.Y. 1981) (finding that the privity requirement was met if the parties acquired the
property with the covenant attached and had notice of it); Gallagher v. Bell, 516 A.2d
1028, 1037 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) ("The modem view, rather clearly, is that no
more than vertical privity is required.").
219. French, Ancient Strands, supra note 19, at 1296 (stating that a vertical privity
requirement in the case of sublessee or tenant is a rule which "produces results which
accord with most people's expectations").
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within the normal expectations of the parties.1 0 For example, a short-
term lessee would not be bound by a burden on the estate unless the
burden is reflected in the lease."' Defining the requirement as verti-
cal privity, however, may defeat the rationale for its retention-pro-
tecting expectations. Even if not explicitly provided for in the lease,
binding the lessee may well be within normal expectations, as in the
case of a long-term lease, which is a recordable interest.' Accord-
ingly, the better solution is to look to the lease for allocation of liabil-
ity or, in those cases where the lease does not specify the
responsibility, leave the determination of the reasonable community
expectations to the trier of fact.3
Like the privity requirements, the demise of the touch and concern
requirement has already begun.224 Many reformers support eliminat-
ing the touch and concern requirement' z and many courts turn to
other methods to invalidate servitudes.2 26 The reasons are simple:
First, disposing of the doctrine does not inhibit courts' ability to invali-
date servitudes;' 7 rather the doctrine's absence forces them to ad-
dress the real reasons for termination or invalidation3m Second, the
220. IL (citing Jan Z. Krasnowiecki, Townhouses with Homes Associations: A New
Perspective, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 711, 719 (1975)).
221. See French, Ancient Strands, supra note 19, at 1294-96.
222. See, e.g., N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 291 (McKinney 1989) (stating that a lease for
more than three years is a recordable interest).
223. L. Berger, supra note 35, at 206-07 (suggesting that the trier of fact should
determine, based on the nature of the covenant and the time left in the lease, whether
the normal community would expect that the obligation to run to tenants or
sublessees).
224. French, Design Proposal, supra note 69, at 1219-20 (explaining that twentieth-
century U.S. courts apply changed conditions or doctrines of general application to
servitudes rather than hiding behind the touch and concern doctrine); Sterk, Freedom
from Freedom, supra note 104, at 649 (noting that currently, courts rarely use the
touch and concern doctrine to invalidate servitudes).
225. Restatement T.D.2, supra note 109, § 3.2 reporter's note; Epstein, Notice,
supra note 50, at 1358; see French, Design Proposal, supra note 69, at 1261.
226. In the twentieth century, courts have begun to address alienation problems
directly rather than relying on the touch and concern doctrine. Recently, courts have
used other doctrines such as unconscionability and have relied on the increased flexi-
bility of remedies rather than using the touch and concern doctrine to address
problems arising from servitudes. Restatement T.D.2, supra note 148, § 3.2 cmt. b;
see, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Trent Auto Wash, 150 N.W.2d 818 (Mich. 1967) (disregarding
the touch and concern requirement for running of covenants and focusing on reasona-
bleness of the covenant); Davidson Bros. v. D. Katz & Sons, 579 A.2d 288, 294 (NJ.
1990) ("[M]ost other jurisdictions have omitted 'touch and concern' from their analy-
sis and have focused instead on whether the covenant is reasonable."); Gillen-Crow
Pharmacies v. Mandzak, 215 N.E2d 377 (Ohio 1966) (allowing a personal covenant to
run despite the touch and concern requirement).
227. French, Ancient Strands, supra note 19, at 1305 ("Early law restricted the crea-
tion of running servitudes because it lacked the means to terminate them. Since mod-
em law can terminate servitudes, it no longer needs to restrict their creation.").
228. French, Design Proposal, supra note 69, at 1220 (citing the tendency in twenti-
eth century U.S. courts to address the policy considerations in evaluating servitudes
rather than hiding behind the touch and concern doctrine).
SERVITUDE REFORM
cumbersome nature of the touch and concern rule made it difficult to
apply and interpret consistently.' -
Nevertheless, notable exceptions exist to the movement away from
the doctrine. Both Professors Reichman and Sterk support the reten-
tion of the touch and concern requirement as a way for courts to inval-
idate servitudes33 ° They feel the benefits of providing courts with this
interventionist ability outweigh the problems created by the doc-
trine?3 ' In addressing the discontent with the doctrine, Professor
Reichman offers a new definition for the touch and concern rule. Be-
ginning with the definition of servitudes as "transfers of owners' enti-
tlement, other than possession, for the efficient utilization of land,"' 32
he argues that by focusing on the function of the servitude we can
better determine if it touches and concerns the land?3 3 Professor
Sterk responds in a different manner. He suggests that the few occa-
sions on which courts impose the touch and concern requirement rela-
tive to the tremendous number of existing servitudes indicate the
requirement is not much of a problem.234
These arguments, however, do not address the problem. The doc-
trine is vague and confusing;1 5 a new formulation will not make the
concept any clearer.3 6 The ramifications of this ambiguity go beyond
case law. Each time a servitude is formed, the touch and concern re-
quirement potentially creates confusion and raises transaction costs3 7
The touch and concern doctrine should be abolished because its bene-
fits are dubious and its drawbacks are certain.
Abolishing creation restrictions does not mean that all barriers to
creating servitudes will fall. While the primary function of the law is
229. See supra part II.B.
230. Reichman, supra note 13, at 1233; Sterk, Freedom from Freedom, supra note
104, at 646-49, 661.
231. Sterk, Freedom from Freedom, supra note 104, at 649; see Reichman, supra
note 13, at 1237-38.
232. Reichman, supra note 13, at 1238.
233. Id. at 1238-39.
234. Sterk, Freedom from Freedom, supra note 104, at 649.
235. See supra part fL.B.
236. Even Professor Reichman admits that his functional test is imprecise.
Reichman, supra note 13, at 1238.
237. The touch and concern doctrine may create transaction costs not brought to
light through litigation. See Epstein, Notice, supra note 50, at 1363-64.
The transaction costs associated with the touch and concern requirement are
magnified when we consider the incentive effects that it produces. The typi-
cal servitude is created by a person who owns an entire parcel of land and
wishes to divide it into several parts. If the original seller fears judicial nulli-
fication under the touch and concern requirement, he will take evasive ac-
tion. He may not sell the land at all, fearing that his servitudes will not run;
he may be cautious in selecting his buyers ... ; or he may try to frame the
transaction in a way that gives him the right to control future disposition of
the land without the use of servitudes.
Id. at 1363.
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to give effect to parties' intent,18 U.S. law prohibits certain types of
agreements, such as those that violate constitutional or statutory
norms or public policy.2 39 Generally, however, servitudes perform an
important function in U.S. society.1 0 Servitude law should avoid the
technical roadblocks that prevent parties from effecting their intent
through otherwise valid arrangements.241
C. Terminating or Modifying Servitudes
Once a unified servitude law that abolishes formalistic creation re-
strictions is in place, the law's concern should be how to address servi-
tudes that have become obsolete or unreasonable. z The difficulty in
finding a solution to this problem is that it involves two competing
societal interests, freedom of contract and freedom of land use.24
This part suggests that servitude law can most effectively strike a bal-
ance between these concerns by narrowing the scope of the changed
conditions doctrine, creating statutory limitations on servitude dura-
tion, and expanding the remedies available to the courts for dealing
with obsolete or unreasonable servitudes.
1. Narrowing the Scope of the Changed Conditions Doctrine
The changed conditions doctrine in its current form is a vestige of
the old model of servitude law.2 4 While the doctrine does have use-
238. Restatement T.D.1, supra note 109, at xix ("The primary function of the law is
to ascertain and give effect to [parties'] intent, not to force them into one transac-
tional form rather than another."); French, Ancient Strands, supra note 19, at 1307.
239. French, Design Proposal, supra note 69, at 1221.
240. See id. at 1217-19. As Professor French noted:
Most residential development since World War II has occurred in subdivi-
sions, cluster or planned unit developments, condominiums, and coopera-
tives. In all of these developments, servitudes impose use restrictions. In
many, servitudes create community governance structures and impose obli-
gations to provide and pay for maintenance of common facilities. Restric-
tive covenants, architectural control, unit owner associations, and dues and
assessments have become a familiar part of the American scene.
Id. at 1217.
241. See id. at 1221.
242. French, Ancient Strands, supra note 19, at 1313 ("Simplification of the doctri-
nal structure of servitudes law hinges on providing an effective means to modify and
terminate servitudes when they become obsolete, economically wasteful, or unduly
burdensome.").
243. French, Design Proposal, supra note 69, at 1220 (noting that U.S. courts ap-
proach servitude arrangements by balancing the societal concerns of freedom of land
use and freedom of contract).
244. The broad language of the changed conditions doctrine, as expressed in sec-
tion 564 of the Restatement of Property, indicates that it confers on courts substantial
discretion to invalidate servitudes. This broad discretion reflects the Restatement's
view of servitudes as socially undesirable and its desire to afford the courts broad
powers of public regulation. See, eg., Epstein, Covenants, supra note 117, at 919 (ar-
guing that the changed conditions doctrine, as applied currently, operates discretion-
arily as public regulation); see also supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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fulness in certain limited situations,2 5 a broad application is ineffi-
cient and arbitrary. 4  Servitude law should supplant the doctrine
with clearer, less arbitrary forms of control.247
The changed conditions doctrine is in many ways similar to the con-
tract doctrine of frustration.24 The frustration doctrine allows a court
to void a contract " '[w]here, after a contract is made, a party's princi-
pal purpose is substantially frustrated without his fault by the occur-
rence of an event the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption
on which the contract was made .... ' "249 In addition, where a party
has assumed the risk of a change in conditions, the frustration defense
is not applicable.250 Thus, the contract defense contains two difficult
hurdles a party must clear before it can use the defense. First, the
party seeking relief from a contract must prove that the purpose of
performance was a basic assumption of both parties at the time of
contracting, and, second, she must show that the principal purpose of
the agreement is substantially frustrated 5s
The changed conditions doctrine serves a similar function. It allows
a court to terminate or modify a servitude that no longer serves its
original purpose: 25 The doctrine contains similar requirements. First,
that the purpose of the servitude was premised on basic assumptions
about the circumstances surrounding the agreement, and second, that
those circumstances have changed so that the benefit of the servitude
is no longer substantially achievable. The functions and requirements
of the two doctrines are analogous, but the changed conditions doc-
trine reaches far beyond the scope of the contract frustration doctrine.
245. Epstein, Covenants, supra note 117, at 924.
246. See supra part II.C. (discussing the problems with the current changed condi-
tions doctrine); Rose, supra note 114, at 1409-10 (arguing that a broad application of
the changed conditions doctrine is arbitrary).
247. Epstein, Covenants, supra note 117, at 924 ("While there is doubtless some
small place for the doctrine of changed conditions to operate on agreements that are
incomplete, it should have at best a tiny importance once governance structures are in
place.").
248. Id. at 919.
249. Chase Precast Corp. v. John J. Paonessa Co., 566 N.E.2d 603, 606 (Mass. 1991)(quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 265 (1981)).
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts sets forth four requirements for a defense
of frustration:
(1) The object of one of the parties in entering into the contract must be
frustrated. (2) The other party must also have contracted on the basis of the
attainment of this object. In other words the attainment of this object was a
basic assumption common to both parties. (3) The frustration must be total
or nearly total .... (4) The party seeking to use the defense must not have
assumed a greater obligation than the law imposes.
Joseph D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, Contracts § 13-12 (3d ed. 1987) (footnote
omitted); see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 265 (1981); U.C.C. § 2-615 (198M).
250. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 249, § 13-12.
251. Id.
252. Epstein, Covenants, supra note 117, at 919.
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While courts narrowly apply the contract doctrine of frustration, they
apply the doctrine of changed conditions much more broadly."3
By following the contract frustration analysis, the changed condi-
tions doctrine would be a less arbitrary tool for the modification and
termination of servitudes. 54 Rather than allowing courts broad dis-
cretion to expunge agreements, the doctrine should require a strict
test as to the intent of the parties. 5 5 Furthermore, application of the
doctrine should be a remedy of last resort rather than carte blanche
for judicial regulation of private agreements." 6 It should be limited to
situations where an agreement is incomplete, and the court cannot de-
termine an assignment of the risk of the changed conditions from the
servitude itself.257 In this way, courts would limit the situations in
which they substitute their view of intent for that of the parties.258
While this substitution is necessary in some instances, courts should
strive to limit these instances as much as possible.259
Some commentators argue that U.S. courts will not, in the name of
freedom of contract, abandon their efforts to control the harmful ef-
fects of servitudes.260 While this may be true, an expansive changed
conditions doctrine is not the optimal means to provide a method of
control. Because of its arbitrary nature and its inaccuracy in deter-
mining intent, a broad changed conditions doctrine creates many of
the problems it seeks to avoid.261 By addressing the harmful effects of
253. Professor Epstein describes the difference between the doctrines:
In one sense... the doctrine of changed conditions is a slightly more robust
form of the doctrine of frustration of purpose as it exists in the general law
of contract. But the doctrine of changed conditions has a more distinctive
and coercive caste. Courts may invoke it to invalidate covenants notwith-
standing the parties' express contractual intent to be bound in perpetuity
unless released by contrary unanimous agreement.
Id
254. See, e.g., Epstein, Notice, supra note 50, at 1364-68 (finding that the current
changed conditions doctrine can be arbitrary and inefficient); Shepard, supra note 83,
at 240-42 (noting that the current changed conditions doctrine can lead to inefficient
and harsh results).
255. See Epstein, Covenants, supra note 117, at 919 (advocating a changed condi-
tions doctrine that acts as a plausible default rule rather than one of public
regulation).
256. See id. (proposing that a changed conditions doctrine should fill a "more mod-
est" role than a rule of public regulation).
257. See id at 924.
258. See Epstein, Notice, supra note 50, at 1366 ("The relevant question, therefore,
is whether judicial determinations [of intent] are superior to private ones."); Rose,
supra note 114, at 1410 ("In putting forth the doctrine of 'changed circumstances' to
quash or limit obsolete servitudes .... authors imply that our own current understand-
ing of usefulness should prevail over the understanding of the original parties.").
259. Epstein, Covenants, supra note 117, at 924 ("While there is doubtless some
small place for the doctrine of changed conditions to operate on agreements that are
incomplete, it should have at best a tiny importance once governance structures are in
place.").
260. French, Design Proposal, supra note 69, at 1220.
261. See supra part II.C.
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servitudes outside of the changed conditions doctrine, through statu-
tory limitations and expanded remedies, however, servitude law can
create a clearer, less arbitrary body of law.
2. Statutory Limitations
Under current servitude law, if a servitude does not specify a termi-
nation date, a court determines the outer limit of duration based on its
view of the intent of the parties If the conditions surrounding a
servitude that was valid at its inception have not substantialy
changed, the court's assumption will be that the servitude survives. 2
In essence, a servitude that does not specify termination survives in
perpetuity. ' Nevertheless, society does not have to expect servi-
tudes to last indefinitely in every case315 A statutory limitation on the
duration of servitudes can change society's expectations regarding ser-
vitude life. 6
By providing a limited, thirty-year life for servitudes, a statute puts
the onus on the dominant estate to renegotiate its interest at specified
intervals.267 The benefit of such a term is that parties will tend not to
renew obsolete or unreasonable servitudes?68 Statutory limitations
will create the presumption of a limited life for servitudes. 6 9 Hence,
the problem of inferring parties' intent as to longevity is limited to
cases where the circumstances change within the limitation period and
the negotiation process breaks down.270
262. Powell & Rohan, supra note 29, at 734.
263. See, e.g., Rick v. West, 228 N.Y.S.2d 195, 199 (Sup. CL 1962) (finding that a
court can refuse to enforce a restrictive covenant, based on changed conditions, only
when the change makes the restriction valueless).
264. Se4 eg., Reichman, supra note 13, at 1232 (noting the "theoretically perpetual
duration of servitudes").
265. Rose, supra note 114, at 1413-14 (advocating natural and historic heritage ser-
vitude exceptions to statutory limits); Winokur, supra note 3, at 78-80 (advocating
special rules for mutually enforceable servitudes among small groups of landholders);
Clark, supra note 12, at 197-205 (acknowledging the possibility of exceptions to statu-
tory limitations).
266. See, eg., Winokur, supra note 3, at 78 (arguing that servitude durational limits
would shift the burden onto the parties to periodically renegotiate a servitude); Rose,
supra note 114, at 1413-14 (suggesting that statutory limitations change servitudes'
presumptive life span).
267. Rose, supra note 114, at 1414.
268. French, Ancient Strands, supra note 19, at 1315-16 (stating that a statute pro-
viding for termination of servitudes would facilitate private resolution of the problems
created by obsolete servitudes); see also Winokur, supra note 3, at 78 ("Shifting the
burden of addressing servitude obsolescence from the discretionary changed circum-
stances doctrine to statutory limitations on enforcement beyond a fixed durational
limit is the most urgently needed doctrinal servitude reform.").
269. Rose, supra note 114, at 1414.
270. Wimokur, supra note 3, at 84 (arguing that statutory limitations restrict applica-
tion of the changed conditions doctrine to instances where the servitude's purpose is
wholly frustrated before the time period expires).
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Some commentators argue that statutory limitations on servitudes
are arbitrary and defeat the permanency necessary for land use plan-
nmg.271 Well-designed statutory limitations, however, need not be ar-
bitrary. While a statute should avoid specific special interest
exceptions,272 some exceptions are necessary. A statute should in-
clude exceptions for specific types of servitudes that may merit longer
lives based on public policy, such as servitudes designed to protect
historic buildings or designed to preserve the natural environments. 2 "
A statute should also exempt servitudes between small numbers of
parties, twelve or less,274 because many of the transaction costs of re-
moving an obsolete servitude would not arise in situations involving
few estates.2 75
Similarly, other types of servitude arrangements do not encounter
high transaction costs as a barrier to negotiation. Where a servitude
arrangement itself promotes regular reevaluation and facilitates rene-
gotiation, the servitude should fall outside statutory durational limits.
For instance, a planned community may intend mutual restrictions to
last longer than a thirty-year period. 76 Having to renegotiate these
restrictions among a large group of individuals every thirty years
would generate exactly the type of prohibitive transaction costs that
servitude reform attempts to avoid. 77 A statute, therefore, should al-
low for internal control structures to modify or terminate existing mu-
tual servitudes involving more than a certain number of estates. For
example, statutory limitations should exempt a housing community of
more than twelve homes that provides for existing servitude modifica-
tion or termination based on a less than unanimous periodic vote of
community home owners.2 78 This arrangement avoids the problems
271. Reichman, supra note 13, at 1232 (stating that permanence is important for
land use planning).
272. Clark, supra note 12, at 204 ("[C]onsideration of any exceptions should be
tempered by the realization that the enactment of a great variety of special-interest
exceptions ... serves only to weaken the statute and make it as innocuous and ineffec-
tive as the earlier legislative attempts have proven.").
273. Rose, supra note 114, at 1413-14.
274. French, Ancient Strands, supra note 19, at 1316 (recommending that statutory
limitations exclude servitudes involving twelve or less parcels); Winokur, supra note 3,
at 79-80 (suggesting that servitudes among fewer than eleven parties should be ex-
empt from statutory limitation).
275. The transaction costs of contacting the parties and negotiating a settlement
regarding a servitude tend to be low in situations where the number of parties is
small. See, e.g., Epstein, Covenants, supra note 117, at 915 (stating that where the
number of parties to a servitude is small, the transaction costs tend to be low); Wino-
kur, supra note 3, at 79-80 (suggesting that many of the transaction costs that threaten
servitude negotiation are not present in servitudes involving small numbers of
parties).
276. French, Ancient Strands, supra note 19, at 1315 n.255.
277. Id.
278. See, e.g., Epstein, Covenants, supra note 117, at 922 (finding that majority rule
provisions for modification of servitudes displace the need for government control);
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of holdouts 9 and provides that the servitudes would not become ob-
solete because the voting provision allows for periodic internal
renegotiation.2s0
Notwithstanding these exceptions, legislation limiting servitude du-
ration narrows the focus of the changed conditions doctrine.2s Con-
ditions surrounding servitudes tend to change and frustrate an
agreement's original purpose more over the long term3m By limiting
servitudes' duration, legislation reduces the likelihood that conditions
will change sufficiently to merit judicial interventionasm Within the
limitation period, courts should not apply the changed conditions doc-
trine to terminate or modify a servitude unless the purpose of the
agreement is almost totally frustrated, the original conditions were a
basic assumption of the servitude, and none of the parties involved
assumed the risk of the changing conditions.2 With a presumption of
a limited life, discretionary questions currently addressed in the
changed conditions doctrine will be better left to the creating parties'
judgment.28
3. Expanding Remedies
While a statutory limitation on the duration of servitudes will avoid
many instances where courts must infer intent, some situations where
courts must do so will continue to arise.' For example, where the
purpose of a servitude completely expires before the running of the
statutory duration period, or a dispute arises concerning a servitude
among twelve estates or less, a court may have to decide a proper
course of action.2 7 In these instances, expanding the remedies avail-
able to courts to terminate and modify servitudes addresses many of
the problems which arise from the free choice/free alienability con-
French, Ancient Strands, supra note 19, at 1314-15 (suggesting a community arrange-
ment that provides for modification based on a less than unanimous vote).
279. Individual parties cannot holdout in a less-than-unanimous voting arrange-
ment because a prescribed supermajority can overruled their vote. See Epstein, Cove-
nants, supra note 117, at 922.
280. French, Ancient Strands, supra note 19, at 1315.
281. Wnmokur, supra note 3, at 84.
282. ld.
283. Id.
284. See supra part mI.C.1.
285. Wmokur, supra note 3, at 84.
286. Epstein, Covenants, supra note 117, at 924 (stating that the changed conditions
doctrine should have "at best a tiny importance once governance structures are in
place"); Wmokur, supra note 3, at 84 (arguing that durational legislation relegates the
changed conditions doctrine to a role only when a servitude's purpose is wholly
frustrated).
287. In cases of total frustration of purpose, even within the statutory period, courts
may have to apply the doctrine of changed conditions. Winokur, supra note 3, at 84.
If private negotiations break down, courts may have to decide disputes involving ser-
vitudes that are exempt from the statutory limitations. See French, Ancient Strands,
supra note 19, at 1316.
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flict.288 By including damages as well as injunctive relief in the reme-
dies available to courts for modifying servitudes, servitude law can
facilitate free market functioning, avert holdout problems, and avoid
the inequity of extinguishing real interests.
Courts normally employ only equitable remedies when evaluating
whether a servitude runs with the land.289 Specific performance, how-
ever, does not have to be the only remedy available.29° In instances
where changing conditions do not merit injunctive relief a court
should be able to award damages to compensate estates for any sur-
viving interest.2 9 ' In New York and Massachusetts, for example, dam-
ages are available where the court decides to terminate a servitude.29
The availability of a monetary award in lieu of injunctive relief creates
an incentive for parties to settle2 93 and protects the dominant estate's
interest.294 The dominant estate owner, knowing that she may end up
with damages as opposed to an injunction, will want to settle to avoid
litigation expenses and secure the most compensation for their inter-
est; similarly, servient estates will be willing to provide a premium to
the dominant estate to avoid delay and litigation costs. 295 The availa-
288. The expansion of the types of remedies available to courts for terminating or
modifying servitudes is an area where Professors French and Epstein agree. See
French, Ancient Strands, supra note 19, at 1317; Epstein, Covenants, supra note 117, at
920-21.
289. While damage awards are possible, they are rarely granted. Ralph A. Newman
& Frank R. Losey, Covenants Running with the Land, and Equitable Servitudes: 7vo
Concepts, or One?, 21 Hastings L. 1319, 1342 (1970) (stating that when courts invali-
date a servitude based on changed conditions they rarely provide for damages); Shep-
ard, supra note 83, at 238 n.64 (same); see e.g., Centex Homes Corp. v. Boag, 320
A.2d 194, 196 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974) (recognizing that the presumed unique-
ness of land has made specific performance a common remedy in land transactions);
Orange & Rockland Utils. v. Philwold Estates, 418 N.E.2d 1310, 1316 (N.Y. 1981)
(recognizing the possibility of damages but denying an award).
290. Damages are sometimes available for breaches of a restrictive covenant. See 2
American Law of Property § 9.24 (A. James Casner ed., 1952); see Orange & Rock-
land Utils., 418 N.E.2d at 1314 (commenting that N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. section 1951
provides for payment of damages to the party who would be entitled to servitude
enforcement).
291. Epstein, Covenants, supra note 117, at 920-21 (advocating that specific per-
formance should be available as a servitude remedy, but only as one of many op-
tions); French, Ancient Strands, supra note 19, at 1317 (arguing that servitude law
should be more flexible in enforcing servitudes by allowing for damages more
frequently).
292. N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law § 1951 (McKinney 1995); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 184,
§ 30 (Law. Co-op. 1995).
293. See, e.g., Epstein, Covenants, supra note 117, at 920 (comparing the payment
of tort damages to nuisance victims with servitude remedies and finding that the dam-
ages award in the nuisance case facilitates market functioning).
294. Shepard, supra note 83, at 244.
295. People generally act to maximize their benefit. They will avoid paying more
or getting less for their goods. Hence, if a party is on notice that courts will provide
damages as opposed to injunctive relief, she will try to negotiate to avoid litigation
costs. If parties negotiate individually and avoid litigation costs the economic benefit
they share will be larger. See Posner, supra note 30, § 3.1, at 34.
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bility of this intermediate remedy, between enforcement or extin-
guishment in equity, encourages market efficient decisions. 9 6 In
some cases, by applying damages, a court can avoid the harsh, all-or-
nothing remedy and identify a more realistic servitude value 97 If the
law can clearly define the realistic value of a servitude, the optimal
solution should ensue: The land will be put to its most efficient use.29 s
Expanded remedies also discourage holdouts. A holdout is some-
one who tries to extract an exorbitant price for her interest.299 Where
legal damages are available, a holdout is at risk of receiving only the
damages she can prove. 00 If a holdout is at risk of receiving only her
true damages minus litigation costs from the court, she will have in-
centive to settle301 Further, a court's decision as to damages to a par-
ticular estate in extinguishing a servitude puts additional holdouts to
the same servitude on notice as to the approximate value of their in-
terest, thus facilitating future negotiation.
In theory, once a court determines in equity that a servitude is inva-
lid because of changed conditions, no interest remains to merit dam-
ages.a Similarly, in practice, courts rarely award damages when
terminating a servitude through the changed conditions doctrine 3
This all-or-nothing injunctive relief can lead to harsh results. The
court must either protect an interest at the expense of market effi-
ciency or invalidate it without accounting for any remaining inter-
est 304 Courts can avoid this inequity by providing damages to estates
whose interests they eradicate. Awarding damages also avoids ques-
296. See French, Ancient Strands, supra note 19, at 1318 ("Lack of an intermediate
remedy has no doubt resulted in some distortion in the decisionmaking process.").
297. See id. at 1318 n.262 (noting that limiting courts to extreme remedies tends to
produce rather peculiar decisions).
298. See Posner, supra note 30, § 3.1 (finding that, given clearly defined ownership
rights, when two parties value land differently and the difference is greater than the
transaction costs, there is a strong incentive for voluntary exchange).
299. See supra note 203.
300. See e.g., N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law § 1951 (McKinney 1995) (allowing a
court, when extinguishing a servitude, to award damages, if any are merited, to the
party who would have been able to enforce the servitude).
301. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
302. The Restatement's description of the changed conditions doctrine implies that
the interest disappears:
Injunctive relief against violation of the obligations arising out of a promise
respecting the use of land cannot be secured if conditions have so changed
since the making of the promise as to make it impossible longer [sic] to se-
cure in a substantial degree the benefits intended to be secured by the per-
formnance of the promise.
Restatement, supra note 1, § 564.
303. Newman & Losey, supra note 289, at 1342 (stating when courts invalidate a
servitude based on changed conditions they rarely provide for damages); Shepard,
supra note 83, at 243 (same).
304. Shepard, supra note 83, at 240.
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tions that may arise concerning private takings305 by providing com-
pensation for extinguished interests.
CONCLUSION
Servitude law serves an important societal function by negotiating
the sometimes conflicting policies of free alienability of land and free-
dom of contract. Current servitude law, however, does not meet the
demands of today's society. Many of the arcane nineteenth-century
doctrines and distinctions are redundant and do not address current
problems created by the expanding use of servitudes. Servitude law
can travel a long way towards effective reform by unifying servitudes
under a single body of law and by abolishing formalistic restrictions on
the creation of servitudes. The reform should go further. By combin-
ing a narrowed changed conditions doctrine, a statutory time limit on
servitude life, and expanded remedies for servitude modification and
termination, servitude law can create a clear, effective body of law
that addresses current concerns and anticipates future problems.
Where would these changes leave Holland? Under old servitude
law a court would have to decide either to enforce or extinguish her
interest. Given the competing interests in this case, a court might re-
fuse to enforce the servitude.3" Under a reformed servitude law, at
the least, Holland would know that her interest in the servitude will be
protected. Under a narrow interpretation of the changed conditions
doctrine the purpose of the servitude was not totally frustrated. The
original intention of maintaining a rural environment survives. While
Holland's claim may not merit injunctive relief, a court should award
legal damages, to compensate her for her remaining interest.
305. See supra note 208.
306. See, e.g., Orange & Rockland Utils. v. Philwold Estates, 418 N.E.2d 1310 (N.Y.
1981) (finding that the changed conditions issue "is not whether [a party] obtains any
benefit from the existence of the restriction but whether in a balancing of equities it
can be said to be... 'of no actual and substantial benefit'" (emphasis omitted)).
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